

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005448

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OTI
NSC FOR MCKIBBEN AND BROOKS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2009

TAGS: [KTFN](#) [EFIN](#) [PREL](#) [TU](#) [PKK](#)

SUBJECT: US OFFICIALS COOPERATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGAINST PKK IN EUROPE

REF: ANKARA 5037

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: In an important gesture of our preparedness to work together with Turkey to shut down the PKK's European support network, Washington analysts presented a list of PKK financiers to an interagency group of Turkish officials. In subsequent meetings, the Charge urged Finance Minister Unakitan and senior MFA officials to react quickly to this list and move forward on a plan to work with the Europeans. Building on the high level enthusiasm expressed by Unakitan and others, post will continue to press to get the Turks past their skepticism about financial measures against terrorism and bureaucratic stovepiping and inefficiency. End Summary.

USG Analysts Pass PKK Financiers List

2. (C) At an interagency bilateral meeting September 15, visiting Washington analysts discussed how the U.S. and Turkey could cooperate to encourage European governments to disrupt the PKK's support network in Europe by, inter alia, blocking accounts and freezing financial assets of PKK financiers operating from their territories. The analysts presented a preliminary list of PKK financiers and explained we now expected Turkish ideas for the target list.

3. (C) The analysts suggested that Turkish counterparts refine the list into a feasible number of targeted names that could be used by law enforcement agencies. The analysts pointed out that in many cases European law enforcement was more likely to be able to go after PKK supporters on the basis of criminal activity rather than as terrorist financiers.

4. (C) The analysts also discussed the issue in separate meetings with the Turkish General Staff (TGS) and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO).

Charge Reiterates at High Level

5. (C) Immediately following the interagency meeting, Charge and EconCouns met with Minister of Finance Unakitan and MASAK President Yarasli. The Charge reiterated U.S. readiness to work with Turkey on a strategy against PKK financial support in Europe. She urged a very quick response to the list presented by the analysts. Unakitan recognized the importance of the U.S. offer and was very appreciative. Picking up the phone, he called Deputy Prime Minister Ali Sahin and arranged to meet him that evening. Later the same evening, Unakitan told the Charge at a social event that he and Sahin had agreed to get back to us quickly.

6. (C) The following day, the Charge similarly pressed MFA Deputy Under Secretary (and proposed Ambassador to Washington) Nabi Sensoy for a quick response to the list. Foreign Ministry officials have told us the MFA has working on a reply to the broader (not just finance) non-paper EUR DAS Bryza had provided at the beginning of September.

Comment: Devil Will be in the Details

7. (C) This offer to work together represents an important gesture of U.S. seriousness to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK and is a significant boost to our efforts to get away from the sterile conversation over PKK in northern Iraq. Though Turkish senior officials' reactions were positive, they did not give much of a substantive reaction, needing first to evaluate the U.S. approach and the list and collaborate on an official GOT response.

8. (C) Going forward, there will be multiple challenges. First, the tendency of the Turkish government to stovepipe will continue to be a problem, both specifically with regard to developing strong PKK case files and in the broader fight against the financing of terrorism. Yarasli told us he did not yet have legal authority to take an active role on terror finance issues until the new MASAK law was passed, yet the

Minister has repeatedly directed us to MASAK on these issues and MASAK is the Turkish FIU. In the September 15 meeting Yarasli told us that the Turkish National Intelligence Office had called him that morning to give its clearance to Yarasli receiving the analysts' list. Nor did TNIO attend the meeting despite our specific suggestion through the MFA. The good news is that our efforts are creating pressure for agencies to cooperate more: the presence of MOJ, MFA and several branches of the police at a MASAK-led meeting was unprecedented, for example.

19. (C) A second challenge will be to overcome an attitude -- perhaps reflective of the Turks' technical weakness on financial crime -- of skepticism about the utility of going after PKK money flows from Europe. One official in the meeting from the Turkish National Police's Intel Department, for example, questioned the Washington analysts about the practicality of targeting PKK finances given that the decision-makers are in Iraq and the diffuse nature of the financial collection network. Last, but not least, Turkish law enforcement has a weak track record in putting together evidence Europeans can actually use under their legal systems. If the GOT swallows its pride enough to allow U.S. legal experts to help the GOT prepare case files, the U.S. experts will have their work cut out for them.

MCELDOWNEY